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Symposium on the Article V 
Convention Process 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE 
Everett McKinley Dirksen* 
I. THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE 
''WE the People," that is the way it began when it was first an-
nounced to an anxious public on September 17, 1787. 
Those words, the beginning three of our Constitution, introduced 
man's finest effort to develop an instrument, a basic charter for self-
government. It said to a world that had theretofore denied the people 
the right of self-government that at long last man's struggle for 
freedom had, in at least one nation, been attained. That document 
gave us, as Dr. Franklin said, "A Republic," and the answer to his 
query as to whether we can keep it remains a challenge to this day. 
How many today stop to consider man's long struggle that pre-
ceded the establishment of this Republic? The idea of a republic can 
be found expressed in Plato's Politeia (translated as Republic) in 
the fourth century B.C., but it was a far cry from that which was 
developed at Philadelphia by the delegates assembled in constitu-
tional convention. From Plato's idea of a city-state ruled by a military 
and intellectual aristocracy with a philosopher-king as head, we 
found expressed in the American and French Revolutions the idea 
that a republic constitutes a free state with the rights and liberties 
of the individual defined and guaranteed by a ·written constitution. 
In the intervening two thousand-odd years we had republics in 
various forms and with varying degrees of freedom. The Greek city-
states finally gave way to Roman conquest, which brought with it 
the Roman concept, as well as the reality, of the republic as a form of 
state. The word is derived from res publica, translated as something 
which pertains (belongs) to the people, which is the common con-
cern of the people. But this Roman republic did not have any 
democratic attributes. Beginning under aristocratic rule, it :finally 
terminated with the Caesarean dictatorship that destroyed the re-
public, but which had ironically come into power with the help of 
the popular party. 
·with the decline of the Roman Empire, the republic as a form 
of government was not again witnessed until late in the Middle 
• United States Senator from Illinois.-Ed. 
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Ages and occurred as city republics in commercial centers such as 
Venice, Antwerp, and Hamburg. But in these city republics the 
ruling classes consisted of the clergy and nobility, and those not 
of noble birth had no political rights-in fact, the very term "citizen" 
had no meaning in this age. As the center of economic development 
shifted toward the Atlantic, larger units of government gradually 
came into being. They developed as nations rather than free cities, 
city-states, or peasant cantons in the Alps. Modern development 
began with the independence that the Netherlands gained from 
Spain. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century provided 
experience for the element of republican tradition and moral rights 
in the thirteen colonies. The Declaration of Independence and its 
"inalienable rights of man," the French Revolution, and the Amer-
ican War for Independence moved us to the final development of 
our republic and the establishment of the Constitution. 
It is difficult to conceive of a republic that is other than a free 
state with free people participating in the governmental process 
through free elections, the outcomes of which are determined solely 
on the basis of free discussion. The very term "free state" means a 
free exchange of information, ideas, and facts from which responsible 
judgments can be made. There must also be present the constitu-
tional right of the people to censure their government at the polls or, 
if need be, to change the Constitution so as to alter the form of 
government-which right has always in our republic been vested in 
the people. This right of the people to decide is founded on the 
premise that the decision is based on free discussion among free in-
dividuals. Only in this fashion, only so long as this right is retained, 
can the people remain sovereign. 
Freedom lost is not easily regained. Those who have taken a 
right from the people rarely restore it willingly. Throughout our 
long history as a nation we have seen the rights of the people pro-
tected by our legislatures, both federal and state. We have witnessed 
the experimentation and the change that the people have made or 
brought about through their legislatures. But always it has been the 
people through their legislatures or at the polls that made the 
change. 
The Supreme Court in the majority opinion in Reynolds v. 
Sims1 seemed to recognize the existence and importance of state 
legislatures and the necessity of protecting the right of citizens to 
I. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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participate in the selection of representatives in the state legislature. 
The Court described the process as follows: 
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representa-
tive government in this country. A number of them have their roots 
in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our 
Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stir-
rings of American political independence are to be found, in large 
part, in the views and actions of several of the colonial legislative 
bodies. With the birth of our National Government, and the adop-
tion and ratification of the Federal Constitution, state legislatures 
retained a most important place in our Nation's governmental 
structure. But representative government is in essence self-govern-
ment through the medium of elected representatives of the people, 
and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and 
effective participation in the political processes of his State's legisla-
tive bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as 
qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent 
them.2 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court then seemed to move 
away from the principal point at issue, namely, the right of the 
people to decide by a majority vote, either in a state-wide referen-
dum or in the manner provided by their state constitution as it 
reflects their rights under a republican form of government, the 
manner in which the membership in their state legislature shall be 
apportioned. How much of that right remains today? 
There are many who insist that June 15, 1964, marked the end of 
a republican form of government in the states and the beginning of 
something quite different, something that is incompatible with the 
concept of sovereignty of the people. On that date in a series of cases 
beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Court assumed unto itself 
authority that had theretofore been considered an inherent right 
of self-government, which right resided solely in the people of a free 
state. The Court in the reapportionment decisions asserted as its 
authority power that formerly was vested in the people. By such 
action the Court constituted itself a "judiocracy." It turned its back 
on over two hundred years of historical and legal fact; it remains to 
this day, deaf to the entreaties of those who have been deprived of 
their rights. As the rule of June 15 is extended to more and more 
governmental units, its effect becomes more widely felt, but the final 
results we have not witnessed, only the beginning. The final results 
2. Id. at 564-65. 
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may well go far beyond anything that the Court majority had in 
mind in Reynolds v. Sims. 
How did we reach Reynolds v. Sims, what preceded it that would 
shed any light on the situation we find ourselves in today, one that 
verges on the total destruction of states as instrumentalities of gov-
ernment and the extension of the federal edict throughout the land? 
I suppose that the best point of reference would be the Treaty of 
Paris, which was signed in the City on the Seine in 1783 and marked 
the formal ending of hostilities with Great Britain. It is helpful to 
reread that document from time to time, as I do, the better to refresh 
my recollection of the authority of our thirteen original states, and 
the authority possessed by the other thirty-seven as they became 
members of the Union. With the signing of this Treaty of Paris we 
became a de jure government; during the period of hostilities, the 
thirteen colonies were de facto governments, united in a rebellion 
or war against Great Britain. The legal situation was not altered 
in the least by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. But the first 
article of the treaty provides: 
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. 
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and 
Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent States; that he treats 
with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relin-
quishes all claims to the government, proprietary and territorial 
rights of same, and every part thereof.3 
Joined together by the Articles of Confederation, these states 
soon found that arrangement unworkable. In 1787 the Congress of 
the Confederation issued the call for the convention that produced 
our Co_nstitution. As conventions of the people met to ratify this 
Constitution, the phrase "We the People" took on added meaning. 
These acts of ratification constituted a partial transfer of authority, 
of sovereign power, that had been ceded by the King of England-
the transfer being from the people of the states to this new govern-
ment. And it should be kept in mind, as was observed by a recent 
witness before the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, that it was the partial delegation of 
sovereign power that makes this a limited constitutional govern-
ment, or stated differently, a government of limited power (singular) 
rather than a government of limited powers (plural). There is no 
limit on the powers that were delegated or granted except for the 
3. Treaty of Paris, art. 1, 8 Stat. 81 (1783) (emphasis added). 
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purposes or objects for which they were delegated, which purposes 
are succinctly stated in the preamble. 
Given this set of legal circumstances, under what conditions, then, 
can the federal government interfere with the governmental struc-
ture of its constituent states? Did the act of the delegates of the 
people in the various conventions as they ratified the Constitution in 
each of the thirteen states mean that the very Constitution to which 
they were giving life and purpose could later be used to deny the 
people the right to determine how their own legislature could be 
constituted? Furthermore, can anyone contend that subsequent 
legislatures, ·when they ratified the fourteenth amendment, the con-
ceptual basis for Reynolds v. Sims, would have done so had they 
realized that they were signing their own death warrant? I doubt it. 
There is only one circumstance, as I read the Constitution, which 
authorizes the federal government to intrude or interfere with the 
governmental structure of a state. That would occur under the pro-
visions of section 4 of article IV, which, in pertinent part, state: 
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican form of Government .... " This was the question, if 
indeed there was a federal question, to be determined in the earlier 
Baker v. Carr1 and the reapportionment cases. To rely on the four-
teenth amendment for authority to establish by judicial decree a 
new system of government for each of the fifty states is, first, to mis-
read the history of that amendment and, second, to substitute 
political theory for constitutional law. In fact, to proceed on the 
theory of the Court is to ignore completely section 5 of that four-
teenth article of amendment. I have often speculated to myself how 
the Court could be unable for almost one hundred years to find a 
means of enforcing the rights of individuals which were meant to be 
protected by that amendment, having actually to rely in the end on 
the Congress and its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to achieve the purpose of the amend-
ment, and then, in an almost casual manner, use power not ex-
pressed, implied, or intended in the amendment to strike down the 
legislative structure of every state legislature in the fifty states. This 
constitutes, I submit, an assumption of power by one branch of our 
government that is unequaled in our nation's history. 
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 
Let me discuss for a minute some of the aspects of Reynolds v. 
Sims, the principal case in the reapportionment cases, although I 
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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feel that greater emphasis should be placed upon Lucas v. Forty-
fourth General Assembly,5 as it more clearly discloses the confronta-
tion between the Court and the people and the willingness of the 
Court to strike down the rights of a free people in order to impose a 
political philosophy of the Court upon the country. 
The Court, after distorting the fourteenth amendment so as to 
justify the end it sought, proceeded to establish the following con-
stitutional principles so far as the manner of structuring state legis-
latures is concerned: 
Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and 
the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment 
controversies. 
. . . We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bi-
cameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.<1 
The principal response to the Court's pronouncements came 
from Justice John Marshall Harlan. In his classic dissent in Reynolds 
Justice Harlan observed: 
Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires every State to structure its legislature so 
that all the members of each house represent substantially the same 
number of people; other factors may be given play only to the extent 
that they do not significantly encroach on this basic "population" 
principle. vVhatever may be thought of this holding as a piece of 
political ideology-and even on that score the political history and 
practices of this country from its earliest beginnings leave wide room 
for debate (see the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266, 301-323)-I think it demonstrable that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not impose this political tenet on the 
States or authorize this Court to do so. 
Had the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter, it 
would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never in-
tended to inhibit the States in choosing any democratic method they 
pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures. This is shown by 
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the 
understanding of those who proposed and ratified it, and by the 
political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was 
adopted. It is confirmed by numerous state and congressional actions 
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the com-
mon understanding of the Amendment as evidenced by subsequent 
5. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964). 
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constitutional amendments and decisions of this Court before Baker 
v. Carr, supra, made an abrupt break ·with the past in 1962. 
The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters cannot 
be excused or explained by any concept of "developing" constitution-
alism. It is meaningless to speak of constitutional "development" 
when both the language and history of the controlling provisions of 
the Constitution are wholly ignored. Since it can, I think, be shown 
beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are 
wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be im-
posed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (Const., Art. 
IV, § 4), the Court's action now bringing them within the purview of 
the Fourteenth Amendment amounts to nothing less than an exercise 
of the amending power by this Court.7 
In his detailed review of the debates in Congress and in the state 
legislatures over the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Justice 
Harlan established beyond any doubt the correctness of his observa-
tions. Having established this basis, Justice Harlan proceeded with 
some observations on the effect of the Court's decision. In this con-
nection it is well to consider these excerpts: 
The Court's elaboration of its new "constitutional" doctrine indi-
cates how far-and how unwisely-it has strayed from the appro-
priate bounds of its authority. The consequence of today's decision 
is that in all but the handful of States which may already satisfy the 
new requirements the local District Court or, it may be, the state 
courts, are given blanket authority and the constitutional duty to 
supervise apportionment of the State Legislatures. It is difficult to 
imagine a more intolerable and inappropriate interference by the 
judiciary with the independent legislatures of the States. 
It should by now be obvious that these cases do not mark the 
end of reapportionment problems in the courts .... 
Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases of this type 
are not amenable to the development of judicial standards. No set of 
standards can guide a court which has to decide how many legislative 
districts a State shall have, or what the shape of the districts shall be, 
or where to draw a particular district line. No judicially manageable 
standard can determine whether a State should have single-member 
districts or multimember districts or some combination of both. No 
such standard can control the balance between keeping up with 
population shifts and having stable districts. In all these respects, the 
courts will be called upon to make particular decisions with respect 
to which a principle of equally populated districts will be of no 
assistance whatsoever. Quite obviously, there are limitless possibilities 
for districting consistent with such a principle. Nor can these prob-
lems be avoided by judicial reliance on legislative judgments so far 
7. Id. at 590-91. 
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as possible. Reshaping or combining one or two districts, or modify-
ing just a few district lines, is no less a matter of choosing among 
many possible solutions, with varying political consequences, than 
reapportionment broadside . 
. . . In one or another of today's opinions, the Court declares it 
unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of 
the following in establishing legislative districts: 
(I) history; 
(2) "economic or other sorts of group interests"; 
(3) area; 
(4) geographical considerations; 
(5) a desire "to insure effective representation for sparsely 
settled areas"; 
(6) "availability of access of citizens to their representatives"; 
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the 
Court); 
(8) occupation; 
(9) "an attempt to balance urban and rural power;" 
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State . 
. . . What is done today deepens my conviction that judicial entry 
into this realm is profoundly ill-advised and constitutionally imper-
missible. As I have said before, Wesberry v. Sanders [376 U.S. I, 
48], I believe that the vitality of our political system, on which in the 
last analysis all else depends, is weakened by reliance on the judiciary 
for political reform; in time a complacent body politic may result. 
These decisions also cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism. 
What must follow from them may eventually appear to be the prod-
uct of state legislatures, Nevertheless, no thinking person can fail 
to recognize that the aftermath of these cases, however desirable it 
may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of a 
radical alteration in the relationship between the States and the 
Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary. Only 
one who has an overbearing impatience with the federal system and 
its political processes will believe that that cost was not too high or 
was inevitable. 
Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of 
the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This 
view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can 
find its cure in some constitutional "principle," and that this Court 
should "take the lead" in promoting reform when other branches of 
government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every 
blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a 
judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform move-
ments. The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental 
to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority 
lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all 
its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that 
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premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, 
even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the 
political process. For when, in the name of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was de-
liberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view 
of what should be so for the amending process.8 
Before proceeding to the case with which I am most concerned, 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, a reference to the observa-
tions of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the earler case of Baker 
v. Carr seems most appropriate. Seldom in the space of so little time 
has the full force of an admonition been realized. In trying to warn 
the Court of the consequences of their decision that an allegation of 
unequal state legislative apportionment presents a justiciable ques-
tion, Frankfurter advised: 
The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established 
by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim now sus-
tained was unanimously rejected only five years ago. The impressive 
body of rulings thus cast aside reflected the equally uniform course 
of our political history regarding the relationship between popula-
tion and legislative representation-a wholly different matter from 
denial of the franchise to individuals because of race, color, religion 
or sex. Such a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole 
past in asserting destructively novel judicial power demands a de-
tailed analysis of the role of this Court in our constitutional scheme. 
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's 
"judicial power" not only presages the futility of judicial interven-
tion in the essentially political conflict of forces by which the relation 
between population and representation has time out of mind been 
and now is determined. It may well impair the Court's position as 
the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast 
range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, 
on which this Court must pronounce. The Court's authority-pos-
sessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be 
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in ap-
pearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from in-
jecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements. 
A hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions is now for 
the first time made the basis for affording illusory relief for a par-
ticular evil even though it foreshadows deeper and more pervasive 
difficulties in consequence. The claim is hypothetical and the assump-
tions are abstract because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower 
courts-state and federal-guidelines for formulating specific, defi-
nite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations 
that today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connec-
8. Id. at 615, 621·25. 
846 1vI ichigan Law Review [Vol. 66:837 
tion with politically motivated reapportionments in so many States. 
In such a setting, to promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is 
meaningless. It is as devoid of reality as "a brooding omnipresence 
in the sky," for it conveys no intimation what relief, if any, a Dis-
trict Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures 
to play ducks and drakes with the judiciary. For this Court to direct 
the District Court to enforce a claim to which the Court has over 
the years consistently found itself required to deny legal enforcement 
and at the same time to find it necessary to withhold any guidance 
to the lower court how to enforce this turnabout, new legal claim, 
manifests an odd-indeed an esoteric-conception of judicial pro-
priety. One of the Court's supporting opinions, as elucidated by 
commentary, unwittingly affords a disheartening preview of the 
mathematical quagmire (apart from diverse judicially inappropriate 
and elusive determinants) into which this Court today catapults 
the lower courts of the country without so much as adumbrating 
the basis for a legal calculus as a means of extrication. Even assuming 
the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges 
in such matters, they do not have accepted legal standards or criteria 
or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial judg-
ments. To charge courts with the task of accommodating the in-
commensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical 
puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to 
judges. The Framers of the Constitution persistently rejected a pro-
posal that embodied this assumption and Thomas Jefferson never 
entertained it. 
We were soothingly told at the bar of this Court that we need 
not worry about the kind of remedy a court could effectively fashion 
once the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on a state-
side system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial 
rhetoric, because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition. 
This is not only a euphoric hope. It implies a sorry confession of 
judicial impotence in place of a frank acknowledgment that there is 
not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political 
mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The 
Framers carefully and with deliberate forethought refused so to 
enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like nature, 
appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an in-
formed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like 
ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that 
sears the conscience of the people's representatives. In any event 
there is nothing judicially more unseemly nor more self-defeating 
than for this Court to make in terrorem pronouncements, to indulge 
in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear, 
sure to be disappointing to the hope. 
"What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Ap-
pellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. 
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But they are permitted to vote and their votes are counted. They 
go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representa-
tives to the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the rep-
resentatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful-in short, that 
Tennessee has adopted a basis of representation with which they are 
dissatisfied. Talk of "debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk. One 
cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote 
until there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a vote 
should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court in this case 
is to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately, 
really, among competing theories of political philosophy-in order 
to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State of 
Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union. 
In such a matter, abstract analogies which ignore the facts of 
history deal in unrealities; they betray reason. This is not a case in 
which a State has, through a device however oblique and sophisti-
cated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given 
them only a third or a sixth of a vote. That was Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339. What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still 
widespread method of representation-representation by local geo-
graphical division, only in part respective of population-in prefer-
ence to others, others, forsooth, more appealing. Appellants contest 
this choice and seek to make this Court the arbiter of the disagree-
ment. They would make the Equal Protection Clause the charter of 
adjudication, asserting that the equality which it guarantees com-
ports, if not the assurance of equal weight to every voter's vote, at 
least the basic conception that representation ought to be propor-
tionate to population, a standard by reference to which the reason-
ableness of apportionment plans may be judged. 
To find such a political conception legally enforceable in the 
broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the 
Constitution. See Luther v. Borden [7 How. 1 (1849)]. Certainly, 
"equal protection" is no more secure a foundation for judicial judg-
ment of the permissibility of varying forms of representative govern-
ment than is "Republican Form." Indeed since "equal protection 
of the laws" can only mean an equality of persons standing in the 
same relation to whatever governmental action is challenged, the 
determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a determina-
tion concerning the nature of the relationship. This, with respect to 
apportionment, means an inquiry into the theoretic base of repre-
sentation in an acceptably republican state. For a court could not 
determine the equal-protection issue without in fact first determin-
ing the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is reasonable 
for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame of gov-
ernment, basically, is allowed. To divorce "equal protection" from 
"Republican Form" is to talk about half a question. 
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic 
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary ele-
ment of equality between man and man that it must be taken to 
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be the standard of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth 
Amendment-that it is, in appellants' words "the basic principle of 
representative government"-is, to put it bluntly, not true. However 
desirable and however desired by some among the great political 
thinkers and framers of our government, it has never been generally 
practiced, today or in the past. It was not the English system, it was 
not the colonial system, it was not the system chosen for the national 
government by the Constitution, it was not the system exclusively or 
even predominantly practiced by the States at the time of adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not predominantly practiced by 
the States today. Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are to make 
their private views of political ·wisdom the measure of the Constitu-
tion-views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if 
not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of partisan 
politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies-the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "itself a historical product," Jackman v. 
Rosenbaum Go., 260 U.S. 22, 31, provides no guide for judicial over-
sight of the representation problem. 
Manifestly, the Equal Protection Clause supplies no clearer guide 
for judicial examination of apportionment methods than would the 
Guarantee Clause itself. Apportionment, by its character, is a sub-
ject of extraordinary complexity, involving-even after the funda-
mental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a 
representative legislature has been fought out or compromised-
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, eco-
nomic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local 
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions 
like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of 
settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and 
senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant 
data, and a host of others. Legislative responses throughout the coun-
try to the reapportionment demands of the 1960 Census have glar-
ingly confirmed that these are not factors that lend themselves to 
evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determinations 
or for which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or 
experience or native wit. And this is the more so true because in 
every strand of this complicated, intricate web of values meet the 
contending forces of partisan politics. The practical significance of 
apportionment is that the next election results may differ because 
of it. Apportionment battles are overwhelmingly party or intra-party 
contests. It will add a virulent source of friction and tension in fed-
eral-state relations to embroil the federal judiciary in them.0 
In the Lucas case the Court was called upon to do the very thing 
that Justice Frankfurter anticipated the decision in Baker v. Carr 
would ultimately require: the substitution of the Court's notions of 
9. 369 U.S. at 266-69, 299-302, 323-24. 
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representative government for those of the people m the govern-
mental unit involved. 
III. THE COLORADO CASE: THE PEOPLE THWARTED 
The factual situation in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly 
was quite simple. It did not arise through any failure of the legisla-
ture to reapportion in the manner required by their state constitu-
tion as in Baker v. Carr or Reynolds v. Sims. Nor was there any 
denial of the people's right to initiate reapportionment; on the 
contrary, the people of Colorado did just that. Nor was the action 
unilateral in that only one proposition was to be voted upon, for in 
fact alternative proposals were presented to the people for a decision. 
Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, in testifying before the 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, described the process 
whereby the people of Colorado selected the plan of apportionment 
that was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court: 
Between 1876, the date of Colorado's admission to the Union, 
and November of 1962, there had been seven major reapportion-
ments in Colorado. Some were undertaken by its general assembly 
and some by the people either by way of initiative or referendum. 
Reapportionment was a much debated and thoroughly discussed 
issue again in 1962 and in November of that year two initiated pro-
posals were put on the ballot. Amendment No. 7 provided for the 
members of the State house of representatives to be elected on a 
strict population basis and for the members of the State senate to 
be elected on the basis of population plus other relevant factors. 
Amendment No. 7 was termed the Federal plan. Amendment No. 8 
provided for the election of the members of both the house and the 
senate on a strict population basis. Then the people of Colorado 
voted and the results were convincing. 
Amendment No. 7 was approved by a vote of 305,700 for and 
172,725 against. Amendment No. 8 was defeated by a vote of 158,204 
for and 349,195 against. Even more convincing is the fact that No. 7 
was approved by a majority in every county in the State and No. 8 
was rejected by every county in the State. You can imagine our feel-
ing of frustration when the U.S. Supreme Court held No. 7 uncon-
stitutional on June 15, 1964. 
One of the points that I make by this is that the people of the 
State of Colorado tried, by their own initiative-because this was 
not a legislative proposal put out by the State legislature-both plans 
were initiated by the voters-by their own initiative they tried to 
make this a crystal-clear decision in our State.10 
10. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Judiciary 
Comm. on the Reapportionment of State Legislatures, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 14 (1965). 
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The senior Senator from Colorado, the Honorable Gordon 
Allott, appearing in the same hearing expressed the further view 
that: 
"What I am saying is that in 1962 the people of Colorado, on an 
initiated law, in every single county in the State, turned down the 
theory which the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself under the 
Sims decision by a vote of over 2 to I; and by a vote of almost 2 to 1 
adopted the principle that our State has maintained throughout its 
life since 1876. It was this constitutional provision which the Su-
preme Court struck down in its decision of June 15, 1964, in the 
Colorado case. 
If there is anything in the history of Colorado which can be de-
scribed as a longstanding antipathy, the struggle between urban cen-
ters of population and the predominantly rural balance of the State 
would fit this description. I can testify, Mr. Chairman, that the Col-
orado plan adopted by the voters, struck a reasonable balance be-
tween rural and urban interests, with neither group having a clear 
overriding balance of power. 
I agree, rather, with John Adams, who said in 1789, "The essence 
of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries." 
This we had in Colorado, our own solution worked out by our own 
people, adopted in free elections and enshrined in our constitution. 
Yet, after the voters had adopted this constitutional provision 
and the legislature had implemented it, an opponent of the Federal 
plan filed suit in the Federal Court for the District of Colorado, 
claiming violation of his constitutional rights. The three-judge dis-
trict court convened to hear the case, held that the Colorado plan 
of apportionment was not violative of the U.S. Constitution, but 
when the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was 
reversed and remanded to the district court. 
One of the significant things-now, the argument has been used 
that geography does not vote and land does not vote. This is quite 
true. And yet in our State we have such a diversity of economic in-
terests that you really do not have any representation, adequate rep-
resentation, of some of these economic interests unless you have an 
apportionment of one house other than on the one-man-one-vote 
theory. 
Well, for example, in our State, in the eastern part you have a 
heavy agricultural interest. And yet this agricultural interest is a very 
divided one, which consists of two rnmpletely different types of agri-
culture-one of which is supplied by irrigation and in the irrigated 
areas, and another one which is commonly referred to as dryland 
farming, and the two of them are completely different types of agri-
culture and their interests are completely different. 
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Then as you move into the western part of the State, a line 
roughly drawn through Denver, then southward to Pueblo and go 
on south, you hit into a heavy industrial area. Then as you go west, 
you get not only again into the different kinds of-different kinds 
and types, of which there are two chief types of agriculture interests, 
but then you get into the very complex questions, for example, of 
reclamation and irrigation and power. Then you get into the ques-
tion of mining, the development of coal, the development of oil 
shale reserves. And these are very, very complex questions indeed. 
So that if you do not have the various geographical divisions of 
the State represented, I do not see how you can do it. 
So I think in terms of certainly a large amount of geography-
but I think also in terms of economic interests of the people of an 
area.11 
Here, then, we had a situation where the people of a state, after 
having proposed two plans of apportionment on their own initiative, 
voting, incidentally, on a "one man-one vote" basis, made their own 
determination as to how the two houses of their legislature should 
be structured. By a two-to-one vote they adopted a plan analogous to 
our federal plan; by almost the same vote they rejected a plan in 
which both houses were to be apportioned on the basis of popula-
tion. The proponents of the defeated plan still fully possessed the 
right under the state constitution to initiate other plans at subse-
quent elections. Can there be any clearer example of a free people 
exercising their rights as citizens of a republic? I can think of none. 
How was this theretofore unchallenged right of the people treated 
by the Supreme Court? 
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Warren, after engaging 
in what appears to constitute judicial mind-reading, observed: 
Thus, neither of the proposed plans was, in all probability, 
wholly acceptable to the voters in the populous counties, and the 
assumption of the court below that the Colorado voters made a 
definitive choice between two contrasting alternatives and indicated 
that "minority process in the Senate is what they want" does not 
appear to be factually justifiable. 
He went on to state the Court's holding: 
Manifestly, the fact that an apportionment plan is adopted in a 
popular referendum is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or 
to induce a court of equity to refuse to act . 
. . . We hold that the fact that a challenged legislative appor-
tionment plan was approved by the electorate is ·without federal con-
n. Id. at 91-93, 96. 
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stitutional significance, if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy the 
basic requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, as delineated in 
our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. And we conclude that the fact that 
a practicably available political remedy, such as initiative and refer-
endum, exists under state law provides justification only for a court 
of equity to stay its hand temporarily while recourse to such a re-
medial device is attempted or while proposed initiated measures 
relating to legislative apportionment are pending and will be sub-
mitted to the State's voters at the next election.12 
In his dissent, Justice Clark recognized the existence of problems 
in Lucas that were not present in Reynolds v. Sims. He explained his 
refusal to go along with the majority as follows: 
I would refuse to interfere with this apportionment for several 
reasons. First, Colorado enjoys the initiative and referendum system 
which it often utilizes and which, indeed, produced the present ap-
portionment. As a result of the action of the Legislature and the use 
of initiative and referendum, the State Assembly has been reappor-
tioned eight times since 1881. This indicates the complete awareness 
of the people of Colorado to apportionment problems and their con-
tinuing efforts to solve them. The courts should not interfere in such 
a situation. See my concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 258-259 (1962). Next, as my Brother STEWART has pointed out, 
there are rational and most persuasive reasons for some deviations 
in the representation in the Colorado Assembly. The State has moun-
tainous areas which divide it into four regions, some parts of which 
are almost impenetrable. There are also some depressed areas, diver-
sified industry and varied climate, as well as enormous recreational 
regions and difficulties in transportation. These factors give rise to 
problems indigenous to Colorado, which only its people can intel-
ligently solve. This they have done in the present apportionment. 
Finally, I cannot agree to the arbitrary application of tl1e "one 
man, one vote" principle for both houses of a State Legislature. In 
my view, if one house is fairly apportioned by population (as is ad-
mitted here) then the people should have some latitude in providing, 
on a rational basis, for representation in the other house. The Court 
seems to approve the federal arrangement of two Senators from each 
State on the ground that it was a compromise reached by the framers 
of our Constitution and is a part of the fabric of our national char-
ter. But what the Court overlooks is that Colorado, by an over-
whelming vote, has likewise ·written the organization of its legis-
lative body into its Constitution, and our dual federalism requires 
that we give it recognition. After all, the Equal Protection Clause 
is not an algebraic formula. Equal protection does not rest on 
whether the practice assailed "results in some inequality" but rather 
on whether "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that 
12. 377 U.S. at 732, 736-37. 
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would sustain it"; and one who attacks it must show "that it does 
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 
In striking dmvn Colorado's plan of apportionment, the Court, 
I believe, is exceeding its powers under the Equal Protection Clause; 
it is invading the valid functioning of the procedures of the States, 
and thereby is committing a grievous error which will do irreparable 
damage to our federal-state relationship.13 
It seems to me, however, that Justice Stewart in his dissent in 
Lucas brought the problem into clearer focus than did any of the 
other Justices. In order to be sure that his views are understood, it is 
essential to examine the following excerpts from his opinion: 
It is important to make clear at the outset what these cases are 
not about. They have nothing to do with the denial or impairment 
of any person's right to vote. Nobody's right to vote has been denied. 
Nobody's right to vote has been restricted. Nobody has been de-
prived of the right to have his vote counted. The voting right cases 
which the Court cites are, therefore, completely wide of the mark. 
Secondly, these cases have nothing to do with the "weighting" or 
"diluting" of votes cast within any electoral unit. The rule of Gray 
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, is, therefore, completely without relevance 
here. Thirdly, these cases are not concerned with the election of 
members of the Congress of the United States, governed by Article I 
of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court's decision in Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l, throws no light at all on the basic issue now 
before us. 
The question involved in these cases is quite a different one. 
Simply stated, the question is to what degree, if at all, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits each sov-
ereign State's freedom to establish appropriate electoral constitu-
encies from which representatives to the State's bicameral legislative 
assembly are to be chosen. The Court's answer is a blunt one, and, 
I think, woefully wrong. The Equal Protection Clause, says the 
Court, "requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state 
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." 
After searching carefully through the Court's opinions in these 
and their companion cases, I have been able to find but two reasons 
offered in support of this rule. First, says the Court, it is "established 
that the fundamental principle of representative government in this 
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of peo-
ple .... " With all respect, I think that this is not correct, simply 
as a matter of fact. It has been unanswerably demonstrated before 
now that this "was not the colonial system, it was not the system 
cl10sen for the national government by the Constitution, it was not 
the system exclusively or even predominantly practiced by the States 
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not 
13. Id. at 742-43. 
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predominantly practiced by the States today." Secondly, says the 
Court, unless legislative districts are equal in population, voters in 
the more populous districts ·will suffer a "debasement" amounting to 
a constitutional injury. As the Court explains it, "To the extent that 
a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." 
We are not told how or why the vote of a person in a more popu-
lated legislative district is "debased," or how or why he is less a citi-
zen, nor is the proposition self-evident. I find it impossible to under-
stand how or why a voter in California, for instance, either feels or 
is less a citizen than a voter in Nevada, simply because, despite their 
population disparities, each of those States is represented by two 
United States Senators. 
To put the matter plainly, there is nothing in all the history of 
this Court's decisions which supports this constitutional rule. The 
Court's draconian pronouncement, which makes unconstitutional the 
legislatures of most of the 50 States, finds no support in the words 
of the Constitution, in any prior decision of this Court, or in the 
175-year political history of our Federal Union. With all respect, I 
am convinced these decisions mark a long step backward into that 
unhappy era when a majority of the members of this Court were 
thought by many to have convinced themselves and each other that 
the demands of the Constitution were to be measured not by what 
it says, but by their own notions of wise political theory. The rule 
announced today is at odds with long-established principles of con-
stitutional adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause, and it 
stifles values of local individuality and initiative vital to the char-
acter of the Federal Union which it was the genius of our Consti-
tution to create. 
I. 
What the Court has done is to convert a particular political phi-
losophy into a constitutional rule, binding upon each of the 50 
States, from Maine to Hawaii, from Alaska to Texas, without regard 
and without respect for the many individualized and differentiated 
characteristics of each State, characteristics stemming from each 
State's distinct history, distinct geography, distinct distribution of 
population, and distinct political heritage. My own understanding 
of the various theories of representative government is that no one 
theory has ever commanded unanimous assent among political sci-
entists, historians, or others who have considered the problem. But 
even if it were thought that the rule announced today by the Court 
is, as a matter of political theory, the most desirable general rule 
which can be devised as a basis for the make-up of the representative 
assembly of a typical State, I could not join in the fabrication of a 
constitutional mandate which imports and forever freezes one theory 
of political thought into our Constitution, and forever denies to 
every State any opportunity for enlightened and progressive innova-
tion in the design of its democratic institutions, so as to accommo-
date within a system of representative government the interests and 
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aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group 
or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or 
highly organized majority. 
Representative government is a process of accommodating group 
interests through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function 
is to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the 
people of a State into the making of the State's public policy. Ap-
propriate legislative apportionment, therefore, should ideally be de-
signed to insure effective representation in the State's legislature, in 
cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various 
groups and interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course, 
this ideal is approximated in the particular apportionment system 
of any State by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often 
conflicting political forces operating within the State. 
I do not pretend to any specialized knowledge of the myriad of 
individual characteristics of the several States, beyond the records in 
the cases before us today. But I do know enough to be aware that a 
system of legislative apportionment which might be best for South 
Dakota, might be unwise for Hawaii with its many islands, or Mich-
igan with its Northern Peninsula. I do know enough to realize that 
Montana with its vast distances is not Rhode Island with its heavy 
concentrations of people. I do know enough to be aware of the great 
variations among the several States in their historic manner of dis-
tributing legislative power-of the Governors' Councils in New Eng-
land, of the broad powers of initiative and referendum retained in 
some States by the people, of the legislative power which some States 
give to their Governors, by the right of veto or otherwise, of the 
widely autonomous home rule which many States give to their cities. 
The Court today declines to give any recognition to these consid-
erations and countless others, tangible and intangible, in holding 
unconstitutional the particular systems of legislative apportionment 
which these States have chosen. Instead, the Court says that the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause can be met in any State 
only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application of 
sixth-grade arithmetic. 
But legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent 
people, or, more accurately, a majority of the voters in their districts 
-people with identifiable needs and interests which require legis-
lative representation, and which can often be related to the geo-
graphical areas in which these people live. The very £act of geo-
graphic districting, the constitutional validity of which the Court 
does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legis-
lative representation of regional needs and interests. Yet if geograph-
ical residence is irrelevant, as the Court suggests, and the goal is 
solely that of equally "weighted" votes, I do not understand why 
the Court's constitutional rule does not require the abolition of dis-
tricts and the holding of all elections at large. 
The £act is, of course, that population £actors must often to some 
degree be subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan 
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which is to achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, 
and balanced representation of the regional, social, and economic 
interests within a State. And the further fact is that throughout our 
history the apportionments of State Legislatures have reflected the 
strongly felt American tradition that the public interest is composed 
of many diverse interests, and that in the long run it can better be 
expressed by a medley of component voices than by the majority's 
monolithic command. What constitutes a rational plan reasonably 
designed to achieve this objective will vary from State to State, since 
each State is unique, in terms of topography, geography, demogra-
phy, history, heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety 
of social and economic interests, and in the operation and interrela-
tion of its political institutions. But so long as a State's apportion-
ment plan reasonably achieves, in the light of the State's own char-
acteristics, effective and balanced representation of all substantial 
interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule, 
that plan cannot be considered irrational. 
Moving from the general to the specific, I think that the Equal 
Protection Clause demands but two basic attributes of any plan of 
state legislative apportionment. First, it demands that, in the light 
of the State's own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a ra-
tional one. Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such as not 
to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the 
electorate of the State. I think it is apparent that any plan of legis-
lative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but 
simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan 
which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective 
majority rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection 
Clause standards. But, beyond this, I think there is nothing in the 
Federal Constitution to prevent a State from choosing any electoral 
legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and 
customs of its people.14 
IV. RECTIFICATION BY AM:ENDMENT: THE CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT 
Having these reapportionment decisions and other factors in 
mind, it becomes essential to determine what should be done. Before 
discussing this aspect of the reapportionment problems, I would like 
to make one observation in the hope that my mvn purpose and my 
actions become perfectly clear. I would say, first, that it is not my 
purpose in any way to express any feeling or preference for any plan 
of apportionment. It is my purpose to try to restore to the people of 
each state their right as a free people to express their preference as 
to how their legislature will be structured and to do so in a free 
election and then to have the preference of the majority prevail, 
14. Id. at 744-51, 753. 
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so long as that preference does not transgress the guarantee in section 
4 of article IV. Any action that I take will be to further this purpose, 
restoration of the right of self-determination to the people in each 
state. I have no quarrel with population as the standard for appor-
tioning both houses of a state legislature if that is what the people 
want. Neither do I oppose the use of a so-called "federal system" in 
another state if the people feel that such a system best meets the 
needs of their state. What I am concerned with, and what I am trying 
to insure, is that the system of apportionment that is to be used, 
whatever form it may take, is one that has been selected by the 
people and represents their choice and has not been selected for 
them by the Supreme Court or any court. 
I would say that we have reached a very critical juncture in our 
federal-state relationship as a result of the reapportionment deci-
sions. What a mockery the Court has made of the people's unchal-
lenged right to vote and choose between plans of apportionment-
or at least prior to Lucas it was regarded as an unchallenged right. 
The Court has already determined that the only valid plan of ap-
portionment that can be approved is one based on population alone. 
All others are invalid. What a futile gesture a "no" vote would be in 
opposing a plan of apportionment based on population alone: only 
"yes" voters are to be counted. The Court closes its eyes to the fact 
that in Colorado, Ohio, Michigan, California, and in fact in every 
instance in which a plan calling for both houses to be apportioned 
on the basis of population has been presented to a vote of the people 
it has been rejected at the polls. In every instance in which there 
has been a choice of plans, the people have selected a plan in which 
one house is apportioned on population and the other on popula-
tion and other factors. Today no state can deviate from the Court-
imposed standard in apportioning its legislature. The people are 
without a choice. 
The question then becomes: "What do we do?" If we do nothing, 
a standard developed by a federal court is imposed upon every state 
and will remain as the only standard for apportioning the legislatures 
of the fifty states, which standard will, I believe, eventually be im-
posed by the Court upon every other governing body in the coun-
try.10 The process is already well underway. 
To meet this challenge to the authority of the people I have 
15. Senator Dirksen's prediction seems to have been quite accurate. See Avery v. 
Midland County, 36 U.S.L.W. 4257, 4260 (U.S. April 2, 1968) ("[Local government] 
units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area [are] not to be 
apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population."). 
-Ed. 
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sponsored a proposed amendment to the Constitution. It would, if 
adopted, restore to the people some, but not all, of the rights they 
exercised prior to the reapportionment decisions that began with 
Baker v. Carr. The final draft that was voted on by the Senate reads 
as follows: 
JOINT RESOLUTION 
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
to preserve to the people of each State power to determine the com-
position of its legislature and the apportionment ·of the membership 
thereof in accordance with law and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each 
House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed 
as an- amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which 
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution 
when ratified by-the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years of its submission to the States by the Congress, 
provided that each such legislature shall include one house be appor-
tioned on the basis of substantial equality of population in accor-
dance with the most recent enumeration provided for in section 2 
of article I: 
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION I. The legislature of each State shall be apportioned 
by the people of that State at each general election for Representa-
tives to the Congress held next following the year in which there is 
commenced each enumeration provided for in section 2 of article I. 
In the case of a bi-cameral legislature, the members of one house 
shall be apportioned among the people on the basis of their num-
bers and the members of the other house may be apportioned among 
the people on the basis of population, geography, and political sub-
divisions in order to insure effective representation in the State's 
legislature of the various groups and interests making up the elec-
torate. In the case of a unicameral legislature, the house may be 
apportioned among the people on the basis of substantial equality 
of population with such weight given to geography and political 
subdivisions as will insure effective representation in the State's leg-
islature of the various groups and interests making up the electorate. 
"SECTION 2. A plan of apportionment shall become effective 
only after it has been submitted to a vote of the people of the State 
and approved by a majority of those voting on that issue at a state-
wide election held in accordance with law and the provisions of this 
Constitution. If submitted by a bi-cameral legislature the plan of 
apportionment shall have been approved prior to such election by 
both houses, one of which shall be apportioned on the basis of sub-
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stantial equality of population; if otherwise submitted it shall have 
been found by the courts prior to such election to be consistent with 
the provisions of this Constitution, including this article. In addi-
tion to any other plans of apportionment which may be submitted 
at such election, there shall be submitted to a vote of the people an 
alternative plan of apportionment based solely on substantial equal-
ity of population. The plan of apportionment approved by a major-
ity of those voting on that issue shall be promptly placed in effect."16 
The basic requirements of the proposed amendment are few. It 
would require reapportionment of a state legislature following each 
decennial census. In order to depart from a population standard for 
apportionment in one house of the legislature, it requires that two 
plans of apportionment be presented to the people so that they could 
make their choice; one plan, however, must provide that both houses 
use population alone as the basis for apportionment of membership 
in both houses of the legislature. This amendment would insure 
that the people would always be guaranteed their right of self-deter-
mination and that, when exercised, it could not be nullified by the 
Court. In essence it would let the people choose how they are to be 
governed. This proposal, although receiving a substantial majority 
in the Senate, did not receive the necessary two-thirds as required by 
article V and was rejected. 
V. THE CONVENTION METHOD: THE PEOPLE SPEAK 
While this effort in Congress to propose an amendment to the 
Constitution was underway, and it has been carried on from mid-
summer 1964 to the present, other forces were at work. They too 
had as their objective, just as did our legislative effort, a restoration to 
the people of their authority to determine the manner in which their 
state legislature would be constituted. This objective would also be 
accomplished through the adoption of an amendment to the Con-
stitution, but one to be proposed by a constitutional convention 
assembled for that purpose pursuant to the application of the state 
legislatures. This effort is still underway, and I have every expecta-
tion that it will succeed. 
The framers of the Constitution realized, as a result of the states' 
experience with the amendatory process in the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the need for a process of amending the Constitution that could 
not be used to thwart the will of the people. The delegates at 
Philadelphia, as the debates indicate, had some difficulty in develop-
ing procedures that they felt sure would be responsive at all times in 
16. S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
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affording the protection they sought for the rights of the people. 
Four proposals were considered at Philadelphia: Charles Pinckney 
made his proposal on May 29; Edmund Randolph the same day; 
William Patterson on June 15; and Alexander Hamilton on June 18. 
The following account of the proceedings indicates the details of 
the various proposals and the manner in which agreement was 
finally reached. 
Pinckney proposed the following: 
If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the 
same The Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention 
for the purpose of amending the Constitution-Or, should Congress 
with the Consent of Two Thirds of each house propose to the States 
amendments to the same-the agreement of Two Thirds of the 
Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amend-
ments Parts of the Constitution ... .17 
As Pinckney explained it: 
[This article] proposes to declare, that if it should hereafter 
appear necessary to the United States to recommend the Grant of 
any additional Powers, that the assent of a given number of the 
States shall be sufficient to invest them and bind the Union as fully 
as if they had been confirmed by the Legislatures of all the States.18 
Pinckney feared the requirement of unanimous consent to any 
change, as found in the Articles, because "it is to this unanimous 
consent, the depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly 
owing."19 
Randolph offered the following resolution according to Mad-
ison's notes: "Resd. that provision ought to be made for the 
amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem neces-
sary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be 
required thereto."20 As recorded in Madison's notes, George Mason, 
in defending this proposal, on June II, said: 
[It would] be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and 
Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It would 
be improper to require the consent of the Nat'l. Legislature, be-
cause they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that 
very account. The opportunity for such an abuse may be the fault 
of the Constitution calling for amendmt.21 
As various details of what is now article V were discussed and 
17. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 601 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). 
18. 3 id. at 120. 
19. 3 id. 
20. 1 id. at 22. 
21. 1 id. at 203. 
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agreed to, a motion was made by Govemeur Morris and Elbridge 
Gerry to amend proposed article V so as to provide that a convention 
for proposing amendments would be called on application of two-
thirds of the states. Madison, however, "did not see why Con-
gress would not be as much bound to propose amendments applied 
for by two-thirds of the States as to call a Convention on the like 
application."22 He had no objection to providing for a convention, 
as he had previously indicated, but did foresee "that difficulties might 
arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regu-
lations ought to be as much as possible avoided."23 The motion to 
amend so as to require a convention was worded in such a fashion as 
to make it mandatory that Congress call a convention upon applica-
tion by two-thirds of the states and was approved without dissent. 
Perhaps it is difficult today for some to realize how highly the 
rights of freedom and self-government were regarded by the delegates 
assembled at Philadelphia. But after all, the treaty ending the 
seven-year war that secured these rights had only been signed six 
short years before the Philadelphia Convention convened. Now, 
they were already in the process of devising a new system of govern-
ment, delegating certain of these newly won rights and powers to a 
federal republic. Uppermost in their mind was the question of how, 
should it later be found necessary to do so, could rights and powers 
be regained once they had been delegated. Finally, after considering 
and rejecting two other proposals, they agreed upon the amendatory 
language now found in article V. 
Article V contains two means of proposing amendments to the 
Constitution. The first provision requires that "[t]he Congress, when-
ever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to the Constitution." This is the procedure that we 
have followed in proposing every amendment to the Constitution 
that has been submitted to the states for ratification. But the dele-
gates at Philadelphia did not feel quite certain that this language 
alone completely insured the right of the people to change this basic 
charter if they at a later date found it necessary to do so. The second 
method of proposing amendments provides: "The Congress ... on 
the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments" ( emphasis added). 
This method of proposing amendments has never been successfully 
used, that is, successfully in the sense of compelling the calling of a 
convention, but applications from state legislatures were primarily 
22. 2 id. at 629. 
23. 2 id. at 630. 
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responsible for Congress' submitting the seventeenth amendment to 
the states for ratification. 
If one is to appreciate fully the situation that confronts us today, 
it is essential to know just why this alternative procedure was agreed 
upon and what it really means. Perhaps Chief Justice Warren had 
something of this meaning in mind when, in the majority opinion 
in Reynolds v. Sims, he observed: 
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representa-
tive government in this country. A number of them have their roots 
in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our Na-
tion and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings 
of American political independence are to be found, in large part, 
in the views and actions of several of the Colonial legislative bodies.24 
The delegates at Philadelphia no doubt saw themselves as the "foun-
tain-head of representative government" and perhaps realized that 
they alone stood between the people and a federal government de-
termined to become all-powerful. So the delegates decided upon this 
safeguard to protect the rights of the people. They decided that 
whenever the people felt that an amendment to the Constitution 
was required they could not be denied by the Congress the right to 
propose that amendment. Such an amendment would be proposed 
by a convention assembled on the application of the legislatures of 
two-thirds of the several states. The people would speak through 
their state legislatures. 
Today the people in thirty-two states have spoken. We now have 
applications from that number of states for the calling of a consti-
tutional convention. In several other states an application has been 
approved by one house of the bicameral legislature. When two more 
are received, the constitutional requirement of article V for the con-
vening of a convention will have been met: applications of two-
thirds of the states will have been made to the Congress. These 
applications are not to be regarded as petitions or entreaties of the 
states imploring the Congress to call a convention. The Congress is 
without choice. 
That the Congress is without discretion in calling a convention 
under such circumstances could not have been made clearer. The 
language of the article admits of no other construction. Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 85 explained the meaning of this 
provision to the people in an effort to secure adoption of the Con-
stitution: 
24. 377 U.S. at 564. 
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By the fifth article of the plan the Congress will be obliged, "on 
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states (which 
at present amounts to nine) to call a convention for proposing 
amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 
part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof." 
The words of this article are peremptory. The congress "shall call 
a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of 
that body. And of consequence all the declaration about their dis-
inclination to a change vanishes in the air. Nor however difficult it 
may be supposed to unite two-thirds or three-fourths of the state 
legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can 
there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a Union on 
points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security 
of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State 
legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the Na-
tional authority.2ti 
The situation existing today is precisely that visualized by the 
delegates at Philadelphia. There has been an "encroachment of the 
National authority" of almost unparalleled proportions. Consider, 
if you will, how far the Supreme Court has intruded its federal 
presence into state affairs, such intrusions coming as an adjunct of 
the Reynolds decision: sections of state constitutions, which constitu-
tions have been expressly approved by the people, have been de-
clared by the Court to be invalid; state legislatures have been pro-
hibited from performing any legislative act, not even their normal 
legislative functions, other than one of apportionment; the votes of 
the people on amendments to a state constitution have been declared 
invalid; elected state officials have been stripped of office and new 
elections ordered by the Court; legislative redistricting has been 
performed by the Court; constitutionally prescribed terms of office 
have been held invalid. All of these are the outgrowth of the Court's 
political philosophy, imposing on the people a numbers game in 
which the people become the numbers. In fact, one threat has been 
made to use a computer to draw representation boundaries. Can 
there be any doubt as to why the people through their state legisla-
tures are exercising their residual authority through article V? With 
the Congress unwilling to act, is there any choice, other than abject 
surrender, remaining for the states? Yet there are a few in the Con-
gress and elsewhere who would deny the states this unqualified right. 
I would like to discuss some of the excuses which they offer as reasons 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 593 a. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton) (latter emphasis 
added). 
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for refusing to call a convention when the requisite number of 
applications have been received. 
VI. SOME QUESTIONS AS TO THE PETITION-CONVENTION METHOD 
It has been contended that the applications are not in "proper 
form." Where in article V is there any reference to a "form" that 
should be used by a state legislature in making such an application? 
There is none. Nor has the Congress in the 180 years since the adop-
tion of the Constitution, assuming arguendo that it has the power 
to do so, seen fit to lay dmvn a form to be used by the legislatures. 
It is not "form" that controls in this instance; it is content and 
purpose. In every instance the applications call upon the Congress to 
convene a constitutional convention for the purpose of proposing 
an amendment to the Constitution. In every instance the applications 
refer to the substance of the proposed amendment as being appor-
tionment of state legislatures. Some even specify language to be 
used. Nearly all give the Congress time to propose an amendment on 
its mvn, declaring the application to be void if such an amendment 
has been proposed by a date specified in the amendment. 
Others have contended that some applications are invalid on 
their face because the legislatures that adopted them were malappor-
tioned. If by this curious line of reasoning some applications were 
found-by a court, I suppose-to be invalid, then what happens to 
the other acts of that legislature? How far back would one go? As 
far back as the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the vehicle 
that the Court used to find the legislature unconstitutionally con-
stituted? Fortunately, such emotional rhetoric can be answered by 
referring to three cases: Texas v. White,20 Dawson v. Bomar,21 and 
Ryan v. Tinsley.28 In Texas v. White, the Court was dealing with 
what is called an "unlawful government," Texas having acquired 
that status by virtue of adopting an ordinance of secession proposed 
by the Texas convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of 
Texas. I cannot believe that those who challenge an application for 
a convention made by a malapportioned legislature can seriously 
contend that such was the act of an "unlawful government" or that 
such acts were in furtherance or support of rebellion against the 
United States, which criteria the Court applied in upholding certain 
other acts of the Texas legislature. I doubt that those who challenge 
26. 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). 
27. 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964). 
28. 316 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1963). 
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these applications would contend that they constitute "treasonable" 
or "rebellious" acts within the meaning of Texas v. White. 
But a more immediate answer is provided in the Bomar case 
where the constitutionality of certain acts of a malapportioned legis-
lature was directly challenged. The pertinent part of that opinion is 
as follows: 
As indicated by the petitioner's failure to cite authority in sup-
port of his contention, the courts have uniformly held that other-
wise valid enactments of legislatures will not be set aside as uncon-
stitutional by reason of their passage by a malapportioned legislature. 
This conclusion is reached upon one or more of three judicially 
recognized doctrines: (1) the de jure doctrine which recognizes that 
a legislative body created by a state constitution has a de jure exis-
tence which is not destroyed by any failure to redistrict in accordance 
with the constitutional mandate; (2) the de facto doctrine which 
recognizes that the legislative offices created by the state constitution 
were de jure and the incumbents, even though elected under an in-
valid districting act, were at least de facto members of the legislature 
and their acts as valid as the acts of the de jure officers; (3) the doc-
trine of avoidance of chaos and confusion which recognizes the com-
mon sense principle that courts, upon balancing the equities between 
the individual complainant and the public at large, will not declare 
acts of a malapportioned legislature invalid where to do so would 
create a state of chaos and confusion .... For the court to select any 
particular category of laws and separate them from other laws for 
the purpose of applying either the de facto doctrine or the doctrine 
of avoidance of chaos and confusion would in fact circumvent legal 
principles in order to substitute the Court's opinion as to the wis-
dom, morality, or appropriateness of such laws.29 
Likewise, in the Tinsley case the court rejected the argument that 
malapportionment renders the legislature's acts invalid, noting that 
"[i]f the petitioner's contentions are to be accepted, a malappor-
tioned legislature could not pass a valid act of reapportionment."30 
Others have questioned the length of time in which an applica-
tion may be considered as valid and binding. Some extremists have 
urged that only those applications received during one Congress can 
be regarded as valid. This contention has about as much substance 
as would be one that urged that any amendment to be valid must be 
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or conventions 
within the life of the Congress that proposed it. Article V is silent 
as to the length of time in which applications for a convention will 
be considered valid; it is silent also as to the length of time during 
29. 322 F.2d at 447-48. 
30. 316 F.2d at 432. 
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which ratification may be had. Since the two actions are halves of the 
same amending process, it would seem that a period of time that is 
reasonable for one act to occur would also be a reasonable time for 
the other. Congress some years ago considered the problem of how 
much time could elapse between the date of submission of an 
amendment for ratification and the date on which ratification by 
three-fourths of the states was attained, and it considered seven years 
to be a reasonable time. This time limitation on ratification was first 
used when the eighteenth amendment was proposed and was chal-
lenged in Dillon v. Gloss.31 
Citing United States v. Babbit,32 Ex parte Yarbrough,33 McHenry 
v. Alford,34 South Carolina v. United States,35 Luria v. United 
States,36 and The Pesaro,37 the Court in Dillon v. Gloss determined 
that, under the language of article V, ratification must take place 
within some reasonable time after the Congress proposed the amend-
ment. The Court noted that the lack of express provision on this 
point in the Constitution was not in itself controlling because with 
the Constitution, as with a statute or other ·written instrument, what 
is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed. De-
veloping the point further, the Court said: 
We do not find anything in the Article which suggests that an 
amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all time, 
or that ratification in some of the States may be separated from that 
in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which 
strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not 
treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, 
the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated 
in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity 
therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable im-
plication being that when proposed they are to be considered and 
disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression 
of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in 
three-fourths of the States, there is a fair implication that it must be 
sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the 
will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which 
of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would 
not do .... We conclude that the fair inference or implication from 
Article Vis that the ratification must be within some reasonable time 
after proposal. 
31. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
32. 66 U.S. (I Black) 55, 61 (1861). 
33. 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884). 
34. 168 U.S. 651, 672 (1898). 
35. 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905). 
36. 231 U.S. 9, 24 (1913). 
37. 255 U.S. 216 (1921). 
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Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable limits to 
fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt. As 
a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress 
to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and 
changing conditions may require; and Article V is no exception to 
the rule. Whether a definite period for ratification shall be fixed 
so that all may know what it is and speculation on what is a reason-
able time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail 
which Congress may determine as an incident of its power to 
designate the mode of ratification. It is not questioned that seven 
years, the period fixed in this instance, was reasonable, if power 
existed to fix a definite time; nor could it well be questioned con-
sidering the periods within which prior amendments were ratified.38 
This reasoning by the Court leads me to conclude that applications 
for a convention received by the Congress within a seven-year period 
must, from a time period standpoint, be regarded as valid. 
There have also been questions raised as to the power of the 
Congress to limit or control a convention in what the convention 
may propose in the way of amendments once it has been con-
vened. My own study of the Constitution, cases, and constitutional 
treatises leads me to conclude that the Congress is not entirely power-
less. First, I apprehend that when the applications are for a stated 
purpose or amendment-as they are in the present instance-
then in effect the state legislatures, which alone possess the ini-
tiative in convening a convention, have by their own action take 
the first step toward limiting the scope of the convention. It 
would then remain for the Congress to implement this attempt 
to limit the convention by making appropriate provision in its call. 
But on the other hand, should the requisite number of state legisla-
tures make application for a convention and each employ in their 
applications the exact language of article V, "for the purpose of pro-
posing amendments," I am not at all persuaded that the Congress 
would possess any authority to define either the subject matter or 
number of amendments that a convention convened pursuant to 
such applications could propose. But is this question really of ma-
terial significance? Or is it not more of a collateral issue? For in the 
final analysis a convention is possessive of no more authority in 
amending the Constitution than is the Congress. Neither, acting 
alone, can amend the Constitution; they represent only one part of 
the process. But I would defer my discussion of this facet of the prob-
lem to a subsequent section of this Article. 
38. 256 U.S. at 374-76. 
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VII. CALLING THE CONVENTION: CAN THE CONGRESS 
STILL IMPOSE ITS WILL? 
The real problem will come, I believe, when we have thirty-four 
of the current limited-form applications for a convention before the 
Congress. Congress has already indicated its unwillingness to submit 
an amendment on legislative reapportionment to the states for 
ratification. Will the receipt of two more applications, so that the 
requisite number is at hand, change this situation? Can we expect 
the Congress then to act affirmatively to propose such an amendment 
and, in so doing, incidentally avoid the requirement of calling a 
convention? I am not that optimistic, but realizing the obligation of 
my oath of office, I am prepared to take the steps necessary to insure 
that the Congress complies with the mandate of article V insofar 
as the calling of a convention is concerned. 
When the thirty-fourth application for a convention has been 
received, I am prepared to offer for immediate consideration a 
Senate Joint Resolution calling such a convention. The resolution 
will require only a simple majority in each house. Since the execu-
tive branch has no function in the amending process, the resolution 
will not require presidential approval. I am advised that the prece-
dents of the Senate make such a resolution one "of the highest 
priority," displacing any other matter before the Senate. A draft of 
such a resolution has already been prepared and, subject to final 
revision, it is as follows: 
Concurrent Resolution 
Whereas, applications for the calling of a convention for pro-
posing amendments to the Constitution relating to the manner in 
which membership may be apportioned in the legislatures of the 
several States have been made to the Congress by the legislatures 
of the following States .... and 
Whereas, such applications have been so made by the legislatures 
of two-thirds of the several States; and 
Whereas, the applications so made have the same purpose and are 
reasonably contemporaneous with one another, all having been made 
in the period 1963-1968; and 
Whereas, Article V of the Constitution requires that the Congress 
shall call a convention for proposing amendments to the Constitu-
tion on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several 
States: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That pursuant to the applications referred to above and the re-
quirement of Article V of the Constitution the Congress hereby calls 
a Convention for the consideration of those applications, and the 
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proposing by the Convention of such amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States upon the subject thereof as the Convention 
may deem proper. 
Sec. 2. (a) The Convention shall convene in Constitution Hall, 
in the City of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania on 
_________ , 1969, and thereafter may adjourn to the City 
of Washington, District of Columbia, for the conduct of its delibera-
tions. 
(b) Each State shall be entitled to be represented in the Con-
vention by delegates or alternate delegates, selected in such number 
and manner as such State shall prescribe, who shall serve as such 
for such period, not exceeding two years, as the proceedings of the 
Convention may require. Upon all questions placed before the Con-
vention for determination by vote, each State shall be entitled to cast 
a vote which in weight is equal to the number of Members of the 
Senate and of the House of Representatives to which that State is 
entitled in the Congress of the United States. 
(c) The Convention shall choose its own temporary and per-
manent officers, including a temporary President and temporary 
Secretary; determine the qualifications of delegates and alternate 
delegates to the Convention; adopt rules of procedure for the con-
duct of proceedings of the Convention and of any committees 
established by the Convention; and take such other action as it 
shall determine to be necessary or proper for the fulfillment of its 
obligations. Proceedings of the Convention shall be conducted in 
conformity with Robert's Rules of Order until such time as the 
Convention shall adopt other rules of procedure for the conduct 
of its proceedings. 
(d) No business, other than the selection of temporary officers 
of the Convention or the adjournment of its proceedings from day 
to day, shall be transacted by the Convention unless a quorum is 
present. Delegates qualified to cast the votes of twenty-six States 
shall constitute a quorum of the Convention. 
(e) The Convention shall keep a record of its proceedings. Upon 
the completion of the proceedings of the Convention, such record 
shall be transmitted by the President of the Convention to the Archi-
vist of the United States. 
Sec. 3. (a) Upon the selection of a permanent President of the 
Convention, and a determination that a quorum of the Convention 
is present, the President of the Convention shall transmit to the 
Secretary of the Senate and to the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives written notice that the Convention has assembled for its 
deliberations and that a quorum of the Convention is present, and 
including the names of the permanent officers of the Convention. 
All applications received by the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives from legislatures of the States, before or during the proceed-
ings of the Convention, for the calling of a convention to propose 
amendments to the Constitution shall be transmitted promptly by 
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives, respectively, to the President of the Convention. 
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(b) Upon the completion of the proceedings of the Convention, 
the President thereof shall transmit to the Secretary of the Senate 
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives in writing a notice 
of the adjournment of the Convention and a statement concerning 
the nature of any action duly taken by the Convention. 
(c) It is the sense of the Congress that-
(!) Upon request made by the President of the Convention, 
the President of the United States and the Congress should place 
at the disposal of the Convention such facilities, personnel, 
services, and information of the United States Government as 
may be required for the performance of the functions of the 
Convention; and 
(2) The Government of the United States should provide for 
the payment of an appropriate compensation to delegates and 
alternate delegates to the Convention and to personnel employed 
by the Convention for the performance of its functions, and for 
the payment of all expenses (including expenses for travel and 
subsistence incurred by delegates, alternate delegates, and other 
personnel engaged in the performance of duties of the Convention) 
reasonably incurred in convening the Convention, conducting 
the proceedings of the Convention, and transmitting to the several 
States any amendments to the Constitution which the Convention 
may propose. 
Sec. 4. (a) Upon the completion of its proceedings, the Presi-
dent of the Convention shall transmit to each of the several States 
and to the Administrator of General Services any amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States which the Convention shall 
have duly proposed. 
(b) Any amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
relating to the manner in which membership may be apportioned 
in the legislatures of the several States proposed by the Convention 
shall take effect as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States when it shall have been ratified, within seven years after the 
date of its submission to the several States by the Convention, by 
conventions in three-fourths of the several States. 
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit to the chief 
executive officer of each State, and to the presiding officer of each 
House of the legislature of each State, a copy of this concurrent 
resolution. 
The circumstances today indicate that it will quite likely be 
necessary to invoke cloture in order to terminate debate on this 
resolution and proceed to a vote. Such an effort requires the vote 
of two-thirds of the members present and voting, which, as I men-
tioned earlier, was not attainable on the reapportionment amend-
ment itself. But the circumstances here are somewhat altered. The 
language of article V admits of a determination to be made and 
states that "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
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sary, [Congress] shall propose amendments to this Constitution" (em-
phasis added). No such discretion exists under the alternative method 
when two-thirds of the legislatures have made application for a con-
vention. The applicable language of article V is "peremptory" to use 
Hamilton's phrase. As he stated, "[t]he Congress shall call a conven-
tion. Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body."39 
The vote of a member for cloture will not then be on the question 
whether an amendment on state legislative apportionment is "neces-
sary" or even desirable. That decision has already been made by 
two-thirds of the state legislatures as provided by article V. This 
vote, be it one on cloture or on the resolution itself, will be on the 
question of whether the oath of office that each member took as 
required by article VI has any meaning to him. 
Conceding that there may be a sufficient number who will re-
fuse to act in accordance with the mandate of article V and the 
requirements of their oath of office, are the states to be thus fore-
closed from having the convention that article V assures them? I 
think not. Legislative leaders of both political parties from a great 
many of the state legislatures have discussed this very possibility 
with me and there is agreement among a number of them as to 
how they will proceed to obtain that which the Constitution guar-
antees them and which the Congress would deny them. Their 
planned course of action is alarmingly simple: mandamus proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court. It would constitute a bit of irony. 
I must confess that I was skeptical, to say the least, when I 
first heard the procedure described: a petition for a writ of man-
damus compelling the Congress to perform a certain act, one of call-
ing a constitutional convention, and if Congress refused to comply, 
a request that the Court itself direct the calling of such a conven-
tion. This procedure when it was :first suggested to me seemed to 
be based more on emotional response than legal principle. But I 
listened to the arguments and then I did some research on my mvn. 
I have gradually come to the conclusion that there is indeed a 
great deal of merit to this position and some considerable amount 
of law to support it. 
The language in article V is clear; it is unambiguous; it admits 
of but one construction: "The Congress . . . on the Application 
of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments." Congress is given no dis-
cretion; it is not left free to determine the wisdom of the acts of 
39. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25. 
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the legislatures; it cannot even inquire into their motives. If the 
act to be performed admits of no discretion, it becomes ministerial 
as Hamilton indicated. It would appear from a reading of history 
that this was precisely the situation the delegates at Philadelphia 
had in mind when they agreed upon this procedure in article V. 
They were apprehensive that a federal administration might re-
fuse to yield to the demands of the states for a change in the Con-
stitution and made it clear that no discretion was reposed in the 
Congress in the performance of this duty. 
I know of no departure from the rule that the courts will com-
pel the doing of purely ministerial acts. Consider what the Supreme 
Court had to say in Marbury v. Madison: 
The government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy 
for the violation of a vested legal right . 
. . . But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual 
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally 
clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right 
to resort to the laws of this country for a remedy. 
. . . [W]hat is there, in the exalted station of the officer, which 
shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, 
or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim, or to issue a mandamus, 
directing the performance of a duty, not depending on executive 
discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general princi-
ples of law? 
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it 
is apparent that the framers of the constitution contemplated that 
instrument as a rule for the government of courts as well as of the 
legislature. 40 
True, we have here three coequal branches of government but 
does that alter the principle in the least? Can the people of two-
thirds of the states, when they assert through their legislatures a 
right secured by article V of the Constitution, be denied that right? 
If so, then popular sovereignty would be dealt a serious, if not 
mortal, blow. To deny this right would be to put to an end our 
system of government by law. I do not believe that such a situa-
tion will or can be permitted to develop. 
But there is one other aspect of this problem to be considered, 
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 170, 179-80 (1803). 
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to which I alluded earlier. It might properly be described as the 
"safeguard" in article V and should serve to allay all of the fears 
and alarms that have been expressed over what a constitutional 
convention called by the Congress pursuant to article V could do. 
More properly, or perhaps more realistically, it should be called 
the "forgotten" section of the article. It is also clear and unam-
biguous: amendments to the Constitution, whether proposed by the 
Congress or a convention, "shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as a part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legis-
latures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in 
three-fourths thereof, as the one or other Mode of Ratification may 
be proposed by the Congress." Notwithstanding this clear language 
providing for another step to be taken before any amendment-
whether proposed by the Congress or in a convention-becomes 
a part of the Constitution, there are those who have stood on the 
floor of the Senate and elsewhere asserting that a constitutional 
convention would "destroy the Constitution" or "repeal the Bill 
of Rights" and might take other such misguided steps. Such false 
inflammatory statements serve only to confuse the public, not to 
inform, to mislead rather than guide, and should not be used by 
those who know, or should know, them to be false. The problem 
is far too serious to be dealt with in any such manner. But there 
it is, no amendment, whether it come as a result of congressional 
action or convention, can become a part of the Constitution until 
there has been affirmative action by thirty-eight state legislatures 
or state conventions. Is any greater safeguard needed than this one? 
I am convinced that it is ample, that the delegates acted wisely in 
providing it as a protection against ill-considered proposals, but one 
which yet permits change to occur when the need is clearly indi-
cated, as it surely would be whenever these procedures are met. 
That is where we stand today. 
VIII. EPILOGUE 
We have reached an historic point in the continuing process 
of refinement and development of the basic document which gave 
us a republic and which guarantees to each state a republican form 
of government. The process of change, as the people would have 
change, has been halted by the Supreme Court. The right of the 
people to exercise the highest function that is theirs under our form 
of government, that of deciding how (not by whom) they shall be 
governed, has been taken from them. There are two ways in which 
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this right can be restored. One, of course, is the reversal of the re-
apportionment decisions by some future Court. The other is by an 
amendment to the Constitution. In the meantime the people are 
powerless to make any change in their form of state government, 
powerless to deviate in any manner from this court-imposed doc-
trine of representation, no matter how great the desire for change 
may be. Such has been the effect of the reapportionment decisions 
of June 15, 1964. These decisions, along with other recent ones, 
lead me to conclude that the Court, if allowed to continue un-
checked, will proceed to destroy that which it seeks to protect. 
